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Introduction 
This paper considers the notion of ÔcriticalityÕ in relation to the Masters in Teaching and 
Learning (MTL), the Teacher Development Agency (TDA) funded Masters programme for 
school teachers in England.  The genesis, introduction and explication of the MTL have been 
presented elsewhere (BBC 2009; Burn et al. 2010; McAteer et al. 2010), including within this 
journal (Burton and Goodman 2011).  It is not our intention to reiterate all of the contextual 
information again here. It has to be highlighted that after the two current cohorts have 
completed the MTL in 2013, one a cohort of Newly Qualified Teachers (NQTs) and one of 
more senior Teaching and Learning Responsibility holders (TLRs), government funding has 
been withdrawn for any subsequent recruitment to the course. 
 
Certain issues have already been highlighted and commented upon in relation to the MTL. 
Burton and Goodman have raised key issues, including the incongruity of only allowing for 
30 masters-level (M-Level) credits to be transferred in when many PGCE M-Level courses 
award 60 credits; the cost, roughly five times the cost of other CPD courses; the paradox 
between the Ôemphases on standardisation and personalisationÕ (p.55) and the fact that there 
is no dissertation element to the degree (Burton and Goodman 2011). Of course, now that we 
know that the funding for the MTL is to cease, much of the debate around the MTL rings 
hollow. However, discussion of what a Masters course in education might consist of is still a 
relevant and urgent matter. 
 
Taking everything into consideration, there is one issue that we feel has not hitherto been 
addressed in sufficient depth and that is the notion of ÔcriticalityÕ in relation to the MTL.  
More specifically, it is our concern that as much of the MTL is Ôpractice-basedÕ, and involves 
research work within schools, this may present difficulties in terms of teachers reporting 
critically on practice in the institutions in which they are employed.  We do not have such 
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	strong feelings about the lack of a dissertation nor the fact that the MTL is viewed as 
Ôpractice-basedÕ, one of Burton and GoodmanÕs concerns (Burton and Goodman 2011, p. 57). 
Rather, what we feel has not been problematised sufficiently in relation to the MTL is how 
far it affords the students a critical schema. 
 
Although we have stated that, to some degree, debates around the MTL may be viewed as 
redundant, we do need to acknowledge that there will be a ÔgenerationÕ of students who hold 
a Masters in Teaching and Learning and that, for the time being, it is a valid qualification. 
There are also many academics in higher education, such as us, investing a lot of time in the 
MTL. It is entirely appropriate that we research the MTL and issues surrounding it. However, 
where we choose to engage with the process is to examine criticality in relation to the MTL, 
something we feel will be of interest to all involved with the MTL and broadly similar 
courses of essentially part-time CPD. Just as there is an MTL degree, so there are Masters 
and Doctorates that are designed to be studied alongside full time employment. Issues around 
criticality in relation to the MTL may be of interest to those involved with such courses. In 
other words, criticality is an issue that is more than just MTL-specific. 
 
In this paper we briefly consider ways in which the practice of critique might be construed 
and practised before going on to argue that a certain idea of critique, which draws upon 
historical conceptions of educationÕs role in serving the social good, is essential to 
educational practice and to claims to mastery in education. We conclude by drawing attention 
to difficulties that may be presented to teacher-researchers on masters courses by the 
closeness of the links between the research conducted and the institutions, the schools, from 
which students are drawn. 
 
Criticality as a criterion of M-Level work 
According to the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education in the UK, (QAA), masters 
courses in England, Wales and Northern Ireland
2
 are expected to meet a Ôgeneric statement of 
outcomesÕ as laid out in the Ôqualification descriptorsÕ (QAA 2010). The issue of ÔcriticalityÕ 
is highlighted in relation to M-Level work, both explicitly and implicitly, we would argue, as 
follows: 
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	Masters degrees are awarded to students who have demonstrated É a systematic 
understanding of knowledge, and a critical awareness of current problems and/or new 
insights, much of which is at, or informed by, the forefront of their academic discipline, field 
of study, or area of professional practice. 
 
And further: 
É conceptual understanding that enables the student É to evaluate critically current research 
and advanced scholarship in the discipline; and É demonstrate self-direction and originality 
in tackling and solving problems, and act autonomously in planning and implementing tasks 
at a professional or equivalent level (QAA 2001, our italics). 
 
This notion of criticality has been introduced into the framework for the MTL degree as a 
required aspect of the programme. To underline this, we set out some examples of this 
requirement in relation to the MTL modules as follows
3
: In the first Module ÔDeveloping 
Professional Enquiry SkillsÕ, the emphasis is on a Ôsmall scale critical enquiry of practiceÕ, 
with students engaging in and writing up classroom research, for example an action research-
type study. In the second Module ÔReflecting on Professional PracticeÕ, work is 
Ôcharacterised by a critical approach to day-to-day practice in the key areas of teachersÕ 
professional standardsÕ, the submitted work taking the form of a reflective portfolio. Module 
3, ÔDynamics of Teaching, Learning and AssessmentÕ, is designed to Ôdevelop É critical 
understanding of the role of assessment in learning and teachingÕ and, in terms of the written 
assessment, Ô[t]he written paper will draw on a range of sources of evidence to critically 
evaluate the interrelationship of learning, teaching and assessment in your professional 
contextÕ with ÔÉ evidence of critical reflectionÉÕ. In Module 4, ÔCurriculum PerspectivesÕ, 
the aim is to Ôdevelop [the] ability to critically analyse a range of sources of evidence in order 
to improve your practiceÕ and further Ôencourage you to adopt an open and questioning 
mindset, recognising the need to subject different sources of evidence, including your own 
thinking and practice, to critical scrutinyÕ. Module 5, ÔDiversity and LearnersÕ aims to 
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	develop the studentsÕ Ôabilities to critically reflect on theory and professional practice in 
relation to the areas of knowledge, understanding and skillsÕ. For Module 6, ÔLeadership, 
Management and Collaborative WorkingÕ, students should Ôcritically evaluate research, 
national frameworks and practical knowledge ÉÕ and Ôcritically reflect on the importance of 
their role as a member of an inter-agency teamÉÕ. (all examples cited from: University of 
Sheffield 2010, our italics). Apart from Module 2, ÔReflecting on Professional PracticeÕ, 
MTL modules thus far are characterised by students engaging critically with  classroom or 
school practices, usually in the form of an empirical research investigation. 
 
Building on the first six modules, the MTL culminates in Modules 7 and 8 which comprise 
the two-part ÔProfessional EnquiryÕ, replacing the traditional dissertation element of a masters 
degree. The Professional Enquiry focuses on planning, undertaking and writing up research 
based on a facet of the studentÕs professional practice, to be determined by the student and 
supervisor. The notion of ÔcriticalityÕ is mentioned in the module brief ÔCritically review the 
research and professional literature around a chosen area of enquiry to inform understandingÕ 
(Module 7) and Ôcritically evaluate the research, interpret the findings and relate the study to 
educational theory as well as drawing out implications for practiceÕ (Module 8). In essence, 
the first of these two ÔenquiryÕ modules is concerned with the literature review and planning 
of the empirical investigation which is itself the primary focus of the final module. 
 
In summing up this part of the paper, it is the case that students are encouraged to engage 
with the MTL course in a critical fashion. If we might have seemed to labour this point in 
paraphrasing from the individual module outlines, above it is because the MTL, in common 
with many other masters courses, appears to assume that the notion of criticality is a 
transparent one, that what it means to be critical is clearly understood by students and that 
their tutors have a common understanding of the term's significance. It is our experience that 
being critical often presents itself as a difficulty to many students and that no shared 
agreement of what is involved in criticality exists amongst those responsible for teaching at 
masters level. The rest of this paper sets out some of the variant understandings of the term 
critique (all of them entirely defensible as practices) and argues the case for an idea of the 
critical approach that derives its legitimacy from historical antecedent. We argue this 
conception of the function and practice of critique is  essential to the idea of mastery in 
education considered as a liberal art. Finally, it is our contention that the urge for MTL 
students to be critical may have been employed uncritically, without acknowledging that 
	critical engagement with school practices and school structures from an educational research 
viewpoint may be professionally hazardous for some students. 
 
Versions of critique 
Scarcely any university humanities or social science course will fail to assert that it values the 
development of critical thinking as a key aim. Yet what is meant by critical thinking or by 
critical practice, varies widely
4
. If one considers the research output of university humanities 
departments critical practice can denote, inter alia, the ability to adjudicate between 
conflicting arguments, to assess the quality of evidence presented or to problematise ideas 
and issues on the basis of some normative framework. For the purposes of our argument we 
wish to establish a distinction between two broad currents of critical practice: critique can 
operate comfortably within its institutional setting, accepting the boundaries, the established 
directions and methods of the field within which it operates, but working always towards the 
refinement of its procedures for producing knowledge and enhancing practice;  or it can seek 
the transformation of the academic field in which it is located, the radical redirection of its 
aims, purposes and self-understanding. This distinction may be expressed differently and 
perhaps more provocatively: critique can be acquiescent in what might be seen as the 
dominant values of society; or it can commit itself, however implausible such a project might 
seem in present circumstances, to the subversion of existing relations of power and their 
replacement by some other organisation of those relations. 
 
Of course, the picture is much more nuanced and complicated than the above characterisation 
suggests. Critical practices can, variously, aim at the reaffirmation of existing understandings, 
at their modification, at their substantial renewal or at a radical transformation that falls short 
of the overthrow of a system of thought or social organisation. Empiricisms can put critical 
thinking at the service of gathering notionally value-free, objective information about the 
world, but empirical research can also serve pronounced social-political analyses which are 
framed within a different order of critique. This paper will argue that the notion of 
masterliness cannot be sustained apart from a robust conception of criticality, that the 
fostering and practice of critical inquiry that is  responsible to scholarly values Ð notably, a 
tradition of thought that does not subject itself to governmental imperatives, a disposition to 
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	interrogate explicit claims to truth, to expose and examine the assumptions that underlie 
argument and, importantly, a commitment to the notion that education is concerned with the 
fostering of liberty and civility Ð are essential aspects of the professional identity of the 
educational researcher and practitioner and, therefore, should be at the heart of any course 
aiming to shape teachers as ÔmastersÕ of their profession. A brief consideration of the 
provenance and the changing understandings of the idea of mastery within education will, we 
believe, help to substantiate this claim. 
 
Origins of masterliness 
Carr (1997) traces the notion of masterliness back to its origins in the medieval liberal arts 
curriculum. What he suggests is that the medieval university, far from implementing a regime 
of induction into compliant thought, had its own vigorous tradition of critique. The student 
who had been ÔdeterminedÕ as a Bachelor of Arts would then go through a course of training 
under the supervision of an authorised master practitioner, at the successful conclusion of 
which he (it would be a male) would be awarded the title of Master of Arts and be qualified 
as a teacher of the texts that constituted the curriculum of the medieval university and thus to 
practise as a master of his craft, the craft of the free person. For the purposes of our argument 
we would draw attention to  two essential aspects of  this training in masterliness, aspects 
which we submit are vital to an understanding of what mastery in education might mean 
today, in that they underline educationÕs aboriginal function of putting critical thought to the 
service of the social good. Firstly, it will be apparent that an important function of the 
medieval liberal arts curriculum was vocational; it prepared its subjects, its apprentices, for 
vital social roles in the priesthood, law and medicine (Carr 1997; Daly 1961; Leff 1968). 
What was at stake, however, was a very particular notion of vocational training. What Carr 
points out (see also: Bernstein 1996) is that such apprenticeships were taught according to a 
pedagogy which developed Ôa disposition to think and act on the basis of cultivated reason 
rather than natural inclinations and desiresÕ (Carr 1997, p.320) and that this was a moral 
education aimed at developing those virtues Ð Carr mentions amongst others, patience, 
humility, intellectual honesty and respect for the truth -  which would work to produce 
Ôcivilised social and moral conductÕ (Carr 1997, p.319). Thus, like apprentices in all the craft 
guilds of the Middle Ages, the liberal arts student was taught the skills required in order to 
perform  according to the standards of excellence that would lead to correct practice of his 
craft, but he was also inducted into a moral tradition, a disposition to think and act in ways 
that shaped the individual and his practice in accordance with virtues which not only served 
	the distinctive excellences to which his vocation was committed, but also the wider social 
purpose within which that practice was located, the pursuit of communal goods. This was 
preparation for vocations which operated within and at the service of a coherent and 
communally recognised moral system and social ordering. Secondly, at the heart of the 
pedagogy to which the apprentice was subjected was a method of teaching which he had to 
master. This was known as disputatio, disputation. Carr says that the purpose of disputation 
was not primarily to add to existing knowledge so much as to Ômodify, through criticism, the 
doctrines of received theologyÕ (Carr 1997, p.319). It did this by employing dialectical 
reasoning to conduct systematic debate, by formulating questions which were subjected to 
arguments for and against. Disputation stimulated intellectual activity and curiosity and 
Ômade radical dissent a real possibilityÕ (Carr 1997, p.319). 
 
Thus, the medieval university curriculum in the liberal arts was (i) committed to  the 
development of individual excellence in the service of social goods which were defined by 
communally accepted moral criteria and (ii) conducted the intellectual activity which was 
intended to secure these social and moral norms - its inquiry into the meaning of revelation 
and the forms of moral practice - according to a method of reasoning which opened 
established theses to discussion and debate; what can be described as a critical 
problematisation of controversial issues. It may be readily argued that any critique which 
subjects itself to such social and moral norms hardly deserves the epithet ÔradicalÕ, to which 
the response might be made that it is only the kind of thought that has emerged since the 
Enlightenment that imagines that it can achieve a position outside dominant discourses, free 
of a formative authority. It is precisely this notion, of an entirely deracinated rather than 
radical critique, that has been established as a vanity, an illusion, by the post-modern theorists 
like Derrida who insists that we cannot speak outside of the tradition we inherit (Derrida 
1978). The question is how we might make the dominant discourse tremble, how doubt might 
be introduced into its theses (Derrida in Kearney 1984). 
 
What needs to be underlined here is that in medieval culture, rational debate - moral and 
critical inquiry Ð could only exist and have meaning within the framework of a unified social 
and moral order. It will be recognised that in the present period, society does not have such 
unity, that it does not function according to a moral system that commands universal 
acceptance and which provides, as it were, the scales in which disagreements could be 
weighed; instead we are consigned to irresolvable conflicts between individuals and groups 
	speaking from incommensurable moral positions (MacIntyre 1981, p.253 et passim). As 
MacIntyre points out, it is as seen as an achievement of modernity that it has freed humanity 
from such moral subjection; today we may think as we wish and choose our own moral 
dedications, free of the constraints and oppressions of a tyrannical social authority. What this 
freedom entails is that intellectual activity is no longer conducted according to a common 
understanding of the purposes of social existence; the academy no longer operates in the 
service of a communally agreed moral system. A consideration of how this condition has 
come about and what it implies for the conduct of intellectual inquiry will help to clarify our 
argument concerning the nature of masterliness in education and the function of critique 
within courses like the MTL. We have no space here to consider in detail what brought about 
the destruction of the unifying schema of the medieval university and the social and moral 
system in which it was founded. Such an account would perhaps attend to the eventually 
destabilising consequences of the Christian churchÕs engagement with Graeco-Arabian 
thought (Bernstein 1996) and it would have regard to the social upheavals of the 13
th
 and 14
th
 
centuries consequent upon the expansion of a vigorous mercantile class which chafed at the 
moral orderings, the social hierarchisation and the communal bonds of early medievalism and 
whose social and cultural ambitions challenged the educational resources of scholasticism 
(Skinner 1988); it would take in the new territorialised conceptions of government, 
originating in the city states of this period, which called for trained personnel who might 
provide practical and ideological service to the princes who had taken control of these states 
(Kristeller 1988); considering a later time frame, it would refer to the final defeat of 
scholasticism by the supposedly superior ontological conceptualisations of Descartes and the 
eventual ruin of medieval cosmology by the scientific inquiries of Galileo and Newton; the 
insubstantial notion of the rise of individualism would no doubt also need attention, as would 
the impact of humanist study, with its newly found sense of the individualÕs capacity for 
shaping and guiding his own life (McCarthy 2000, p.55), its practical, even vocational 
orientation and its role in shaping the sensibilities and the moral perspectives of the future 
rulers and leaders of society. However, for our purposes we will focus on that event in 
intellectual history which marked out a willed project for the overcoming and replacement, 
on a secular basis, of the medieval intellectual and moral system Ð the Enlightenment.   
 
Modernity and critique 
 
	The promise of the Enlightenment - the project of modernity - was that the systematic 
application of reason to human affairs would free humanity from ignorance, unthinking 
conformity to authority and the infantilising constraints of dominatory power, that the 
production and dissemination of knowledge must lead to progress towards a just and rational 
social order and that the principles upon which such a society should be based could be 
identified and could command universal assent. The task of education was to form morally 
autonomous individuals who might, acting upon those principles, critique and counter 
irrational belief, prejudice and the coercions of arbitrarily constituted power. Underpinning 
the project was the conviction that human knowledge, as it was accumulated, could be 
assembled into a unity that would correspond to and bring about a fully rational social order. 
The task of scholarship as it was enshrined in the modern university was to add to the edifice 
of human knowledge and thus to contribute to the realisation of that social order. It was, says 
Carr, this meta-narrative that underlay the self-understandings in terms of which the first 
professors of education legitimised their roles (Carr 1997, p.314) and which was also, we 
would submit, the narrative which explained and justified their role and function to the 
educational practitioners of the modern age. However, the core postulates of Enlightenment 
rationalism have been subject to philosophical refutation (Foucault 1970; Horkheimer and 
Adorno 1973; Lyotard 1984; MacIntyre 1981; MacIntyre 1996; Rorty 1979; Taylor 1989). 
We no longer believe that the recalcitrant stuff of humanity is susceptible to the totalisations 
of rational scheming (and have good reason to be wary of projects which claim to order 
society on rational lines); we know  that the principles underpinning Enlightenment have no 
universality or, indeed, any existence beyond the speculative musings of philosophers; we no 
longer subscribe to the notion that knowledge may be formed into a coherent whole which 
mirrors the world or represents its ideal, but somehow achievable, true form. An age of 
modernity has - whether we welcome it or loathe the idea - yielded to an age of 
postmodernity. Yet the Enlightenment narrative continues to provide a kind of rationale for 
many educational professionals, what MacIntyre calls Ôa set of no longer quite held, not to be 
explicitly articulated, background presuppositions, a set of almost but not quite believed 
propositions still informing both the academic curriculum and modes of teaching and enquiry 
(MacIntyre 1996, p.229). 
 
Schools of education in the modern Ð which is to say, erstwhile -  university may be viewed 
as having defined themselves in opposition to the faith-based inquiry of the medieval 
university, believing that it was possible and necessary to found education, as a system of 
	teaching, learning and inquiry, on the basis of reason rather than a willing and pious 
subjection to received truths. And, of course, the task of the academy, and, in particular, 
philosophers of education, was seen as indicating to government, after diligent research and 
reflection, the forms of education appropriate to the schooling of young people in our society. 
(A brief reflection on the history of the influence of this branch of the educational academy 
on the decisions of policy makers will suggest that this relationship is more imagined than 
real). The enterprise outlined above was doomed to failure because it was an attempt to 
impose a set of abstract theoretical analyses upon human activity and social intercourse, a 
rationalist project that had no purchase on, no roots in and no means of inserting itself into 
the lived and subjective experience of humanity (MacIntyre 1981). In this, it stood in stark 
contrast to the medieval system of thought it sought to replace. Premodern Christian ontology 
and epistemology were embedded in, nourished by and, in turn, they animated a way of life 
that was understood by, and informed the self-understandings of all who belonged to that 
society. 
 
Foucault said that the thread connecting us to the Enlightenment was not a doctrinal one but 
might be Ôa philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our 
historical eraÕ (Foucault 1984, p.42). Perhaps one of the tasks of such a critique might be to 
address the problems - identified here - that it unwittingly gave form to: how can the impulse 
towards justice and liberty, moral discourse and the kinds of knowledge it generates, be 
connected to the realm of social decision-making; how can the production of knowledge be 
connected to and inform the moral experience of the diverse communities of contemporary 
existence? For education, the question presents itself, how can teaching and learning re-
establish their link to moral reflection and practice? 
 
The unworldliness of critique 
The point, then, is that enlightenment thought, and all the progressive, emancipatory 
educational projects that flowed from it, have never found lodging within a communally 
accepted understanding of the social good. This is the price paid for the profound social 
transformations which led to the freeing of Western thought from the limits and boundaries of 
the medieval world view. The gain of thinking and, eventually, acting freely outside a 
systematised and unquestionable set of moral and ontological precepts led eventually to the 
fragmentation of communal life and the endless and irreconcilable moral conflicts and 
disputes that characterise the divided social existence of  the world we inhabit. In such an 
	environment no moral authority can claim universal recognition and the reforming, 
rationalising critiques, the prescriptive formulations, of modernist thought appear as forlorn 
attempts to impose an abstract and idealised conceptualisation of moral order upon 
irrecoverably divided social and cultural forms. Where the critical inquiry and debate of 
medieval scholarship was geared to the positive task of refining interpretation of the religious 
texts whose theses were the bedrock of  the medieval order, in order to establish the true 
understandings that would lead to civilised social and moral conduct (Carr 1997, p.320), 
moral-theoretical critique today is consigned to a negative role, anatomising and seeking to 
correct the misconstruals and the wrong directions taken by a society where thought, reason 
itself, has gone into error and the great rationalising project of Enlightenment betrayed
5
. 
Hunter (1994) has an image for what he sees as this vain and unworldly moral posture: 
principled critical theorists view the modern school system and see a lowly church built out 
of stones intended for a cathedral, an edifice which speaks of a potential that has been 
unrealised because of its buildersÕ loss of faith, their Ômoral and spiritual bankruptcyÕ. The 
school is configured as Ôthe flawed realisation of an ideal formÕ (Hunter 1994, p.1).  HunterÕs 
target is theoretical or moral critique, the practice that proposes to uncover the hidden nature 
of things, the true social or economic relations that underlie social experience, to lay bare the 
abusive realities of power that operate under the surface of things; this is the practice that 
reveals to a benighted populace that its perceptions, its beliefs are illusory and promises to 
correct its mistaken assumptions so that it might organise society on rational lines. Critique, 
in this view, stands outside social reality, a carping meta-analysis that is scornful of the 
untidy, messy improvisations, compromises and wheeler-dealing involved in the necessary 
business of actually administering and ordering human affairs. It offers ethically pure but 
unworldly solutions to the mundane problems of government. In popular usage, criticism is 
equated with negativity, as a heartless and destructive activity and, in a time-worn complaint, 
entrenched authorities charge that critical voices have nothing positive to offer by way of 
alternatives to current policy. At a more philosophical level, the Nietzschean sense of critique 
as an attempt to impose a restrictive organisation, a rationing, of human thought and 
behaviour in accordance with a miserably impoverished and sceptical reading of the world, is 
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	to be found in comments like these of Bruno LatourÕs, comments which strikingly evoke the 
delightedly self-righteous judgementalism that he and others detect in the critical attitude: 
Do you see now why it feels so good to be a critical mind? Why critique, this most 
ambiguous pharmakon, has become such a potent, euphoric drug? You are always right! 
When nave believers are clinging forcefully to their objects, their gods, their poetry, their 
cherished objects, you can turn all of those attachments into so many fetishes and humiliate 
all the believers by showing that it is nothing but their own projection, that you alone can see. 
[Then] you strike them and humiliate them again, this time by showing that, whatever they 
think, their behaviour is entirely determined by the action of powerful causalities coming 
from an objective reality they donÕt see, but that you, the never sleeping critic, alone can see. 
IsnÕt this fabulous? IsnÕt it really worth going to graduate school to study critique? (Latour 
2004, pp.238-239) 
 
Both Hunter and Latour offer a somewhat caricatured and unnuanced account of the critical 
personality, but their depiction of critique as an intellectual activity, a theoretical method that 
is divorced or excluded from (they would say, has divorced itself from, has stood aloof from), 
the realm of social decision-making, a style of thought that has become irrelevant to the 
government (and education is a form of government) of human affairs, is accurate. The 
critical problematisation of the thinking that structures our social being is marginalised, 
rendered irrelevant to the concerns and activities of government because, as we have 
indicated, a moral discourse has no integral and privileged place in the ordering of a society 
that has abandoned, has - happily or regretfully set aside - commitment to the notion that 
civility is dependent on the construction of a common social purpose, a unified moral system. 
Such a state of affairs may have been an historical inevitability, may be a trying stage en 
route to a new mode of social existence or it might, as MacIntyre suggests, be a disastrous 
historical aberration, an irruption of barbarism whose correction we must hope for. 
 
Education in the age of technical rationality 
It is not difficult to see that what we must perhaps refer to as postmodern government does 
not seek to order society according to a particular overarching moral purpose and it will not 
surprise us that education systems in the present period are not organised by a concern for the 
pursuit of the moral truths that will foster right living. The disjointed, fragmented curricula of 
the modern humanities academy, with their catch-all structures of modular courses, ad hoc 
training in competing methodologies and their ever-shifting modes of assessment are clearly 
	intended to be responsive to the disjointed and fragmented social reality to which the 
academy must address its scholarly and educational activity. They are structured and they 
operate without the narrative and teleological legitimations that guided the endeavours of pre-
modern and modern universities. It would, however, be wrong to conclude that the pursuit 
and dissemination of knowledge Ð education Ð functions to no commonly understood 
purpose, is subject to no ordering governmental imperatives. 
 
Education today works to sustain a system, just as scholasticism and medieval education 
worked to sustain the social and moral order of the Christian world view. It is not a system 
that commands universal assent and it is a system whose priorities, rather than being derived 
from any traditional understanding of the relation between education and society, are 
imposed upon education from without. In our period education is shaped, regulated and 
administered in the service of economic priorities and instrumental ends.  As we have seen, it 
is only recently that an understanding of education as a means to an end other than education 
itself has come to dominance (Carr 1997, pp.324-325).  Education is now routinely viewed  
in emphatically utilitarian or instrumental terms Ð from the perspective of government, its 
vital role in enhancing the nationÕs economic competitivity, in producing a flexible, adaptable 
and skilled work force and, from the viewpoint of the subject of education, its function in 
securing the qualifications that will lead to a good job and social progression. One might add 
to this list of extrinsic justifications for the importance of education the service it has 
performed throughout the period of popular and compulsory schooling - the gentling of 
problem populations (Donald 1992; Hunter 1994). From the point when capitalism detached 
itself from what Weber saw as the Calvinist ethical commitments that had been the necessary 
cradle for its modern development, from that point when capitalism allied itself to the post-
Enlightenment understanding of knowledge as a process of scientific and technical 
rationalisation in the service of progress, critique Ð the moral problematisation of social 
issues Ð was set, along with spiritual exhortation, on a path to increasing marginalisation in 
the consideration of how human life might be organised and governed. This was a passage, 
traced by thinkers like Benjamin and Adorno, whose final destination, the imperium of 
instrumental rationality, was described by Lyotard as a period in which knowledge had been 
replaced by data. In a socio-economic order which Ôdetotalises meaningÕ, functioning at Ôthe 
level of truth-without meaningÕ (!i"ek 2008, p.68), as a completely value-neutral machine 
(!i"ek 2008, p.133), there can be, to put it in Foucauldian terms, no position of enunciation 
for critique. Weber, Adorno, even Lyotard, write the pathos of critique. Another way of 
	putting the matter is that a world which can only be governed by a pragmatic, yet 
sophisticated technical rationality, can (quite properly) find no usefulness for analyses that 
have been passed through the unworldly (literally so, for it has no place within a 
governmental domain ordered to instrumental considerations) sensibility of the moral 
theoretician (Hunter 1994). The only debate that matters centres on technical questions of 
how the system can be made more effective. 
 
It seems that educational research, if it is to survive, has to become useful, which is to say, it 
has to show itself capable of effective contribution to the social and economic goals set by 
government. Such a view of the educational researcherÕs role accepts a heteronomous 
determination of the purposes of education, speaking Ôas the reflex of an unquestioned 
societyÕ (Borrelli 2004, p.449), bleeding dissent and values debate from educational 
discourse, so that the truths research produces only have meaning, can only have sense, 
within the strictly policed boundaries of a technical-economic rationality. These 
circumstances present a daunting challenge to the community of education and to those who 
are responsible for the formation of masters of education. In setting out, within the limits of a 
brief study such as this, educationÕs historical responsibilities, we have sought to indicate a 
tradition of inquiry that has sustained the pursuit of masterliness in education through 
premodern and modern periods. We outline below the implications of that tradition and the 
responsibilities it brings in train for educators in the present period. 
 
Masterliness and critique in the postmodern 
We argue that the claim to mastership of the craft or profession of education can only be 
sustained by an awareness of, and responsibility to, an idea of critique as the activity of 
testing the dominant theses structuring educational discourse. However, as we have argued, 
the story of modernity was the story of the disconnection of moral discourse from the realm 
of social decision-making. It was the story of the disembodiment of knowledge, its divorce 
from the knower and from the personal moral commitments formed in the exchanges and 
interactions of communities which achieve cohesion through a shared morality. In 
postmodernity, critique has lost its grounding in such communities and has been marginalised 
by an instrumental rationality which is driven by the implacable impulses of modern 
capitalism. Unrestrained by any concern to consider how the production, transformation and 
dissemination of knowledge can serve the ends of moral community, of a just and ordered 
sociality, the work of education is put at the disposal of bureaucratic rationality and the 
	market economics it serves. How then can the activity of critique find purchase within a 
system of education which, as we have shown, has evolved to ensure its exclusion, its 
irrelevance? How can its practices be legitimated within a domain that is now governed by a 
radically unsympathetic rationality? 
 
We have shown that in its medieval origins the enterprise of education was dedicated to the 
task of developing in is students mastery of its distinctive craft, the craft of the free person, 
and that that craft was committed to the realisation of a morally fulfilling life by way of 
serving a wider social purpose, the pursuit of the communal good. Our argument is that such 
moral and social purpose is an essential, ineradicable component of educational practice and 
that its marginalisation in current educational discourse testifies to the extent of the fieldÕs 
subsumption by a technical rationality which lacks the resources required for the construction 
of civilised social being. It is, then, through a renewed understanding of the tradition of moral 
and intellectual inquiry in which we are located that teachers and researchers may find the 
resources needed to endure and resist technicist definitions of their roles, definitions which 
distort and would defeat the essential purposes and dedications of their craft. It is within such 
an understanding that critique would acquire the legitimacy and potency - one might say, the 
performativity - that it otherwise lacks. We are not, of course, arguing for a return to the 
forms and protocols of the medieval liberal arts curriculum and, least of all, for a return to the 
obediences and obligations Ð the power relations Ð of that period, but we are arguing for a 
similar intensity of moral performance to be brought to bear upon the urgent matter of  
forming the free and responsible, self-governing citizenry required by an aspirationally 
democratic society. 
 
On our analysis, educational mastery must entail the inculcation of a very precise critical 
disposition. It is the disposition to assess each and every policy initiative, every 
administrative expedient urged or imposed upon educational practice, in the light of the 
question, Will this measure contribute to or detract from the task of sustaining and extending 
civility and the virtues of justice and liberty which underpin that goal? 
 
A concluding and cautionary note 
An insistence on critical rigour in teaching the MTL presents difficulties and problems. 
Courses like the MTL are marketed to schools on the basis of their usefulness to the 
developmental ambitions of those schools; a synergy is proposed between the research 
	interests and activities fostered by the course and schoolsÕ aims and priorities. We would not 
wish to dispute that masters research carried out by teacher-researchers should be of value to 
schools; we firmly believe that such inquiry, well-conducted, must enhance educational 
practice and thus be of benefit to the schools involved. However, what is perhaps too much 
taken for granted is that there will always be accord between the interests, the educational 
convictions and the priorities of a schoolÕs senior management and those of the classroom 
teachers who undertake a masters course. To put it baldly, critical analysis is not always 
welcomed unreservedly, and teachers may be reluctant to air their views if they conflict with 
their schoolÕs official aims and strategies. We make no recommendations about how such 
misalignments of perspective and purpose might be handled, although we would argue that a 
masters course in education should always prioritise  the claims of independent research over 
those of educational bureaucracy. We merely observe that these are problems which are 
bound to arise when academic courses, concerned with developing individual mastery in 
education, also offer themselves to schools as likely to produce outcomes that will coincide 
with their administrative and pedagogical plans.   
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